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Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence

Författare: Stefan Eriksson, Och Jonas Lagerström, Och

Publicerad i: Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2006, vol. 108, iss. 3, pp. 373-396

Sammanfattning av Working paper 2004:2

We use the Swedish Job Applicant Database to empirically investigate whether
being unemployed per se reduces the probability to get contacted by a firm.
This database contains personal characteristics and preferences over the type of
job the applicant wants to find. The data is submitted both by employed and
unemployed workers over the Internet by the applicants themselves. This
means that we have access to exactly the same information as firms have when
they choose whom to contact. Our results show that an unemployed applicant
faces a lower probability to get contacted by a firm than an otherwise identical
employed applicant, thus supporting the claim that firms view employment
status as an important signal for productivity.
Keywords: Employed and unemployed job seekers, discrimination.
JEL classification: J64, J71.

We use the Swedish Job Applicant Database to empirically investigate whether being unemployed per se reduces the probability to get contacted by a firm. This database contains personal characteristics and preferences over the type of job the applicant wants to find. The data is submitted both by employed and unemployed workers over the Internet by the applicants themselves. This means that we have access to exactly the same information as firms have when they choose whom to contact. Our results show that an unemployed applicant faces a lower probability to get contacted by a firm than an otherwise identical employed applicant, thus supporting the claim that firms view employment status as an important signal for productivity.

Keywords: Employed and unemployed job seekers, discrimination.
JEL classification: J64, J71.

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